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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Similarly, to impute that an individual is unable to meet his obligations, or that

one is the victim of abject poverty has been found libelous per se. Gross v. Needharn Co-Operative Bank, 312 Mass. 309, 44 N. E. 2d 690 (1942). Katapodis v.
-Brooklyn Spectator Inc., supra. See Note 3 A. L R. 1590 (1918).
The refusal of a majority of the courts to hold that charges of indebtedness
or delinquency in paying a debt are libelous per se when published concerning
a non-trader seems to proceed upon the theory that unless such imputations
reflect upon a trader or merchant who needs credit in his business, or unless the
charges can be construed to impute dishonesty or insolvency so as to impeach the
reputation of a non-trader, there can be no legal presumption of damages. The
majority theory is not espoused by the Restatement, Torts Sec. 559, Comment b
(1938):
"Communications are often defamatory because they
tend to expose
another to hatred, ridicule, and contempt. A defamatory communication may tend to disparage another by reflecting unfavorably upon his
personal morality or integrity, or it may consist of imputations which,
while not affecting another's personal reputation, tend to discredit his
financial standing in the community, and this is so whether or not the
other is engaged in business or industry."
In view of the true nature of libel per se as propounded in the instant case,
the distinction made by the majority of states between the credit reputation of
traders and merchants as opposed to the individual's financial reputation represents an erroneous graft upon the law of libel per se. Moreover, the theory
upon which this distinction reposes seems to ring artificial iii the light of an
individual's credit needs and modern credit practices.
Maynard C. Schaus, Jr.
INSURANCE-FIDELITY BONDS HELD CONTINUING CONTRACTRECOVERY DENIED BEYOND FACE VALUE
Plaintiff was insured against losses through embezzlement by employees under
a Blanket Position Bond issued by defendant insurer; the amount of the defendant's
maximum liability as to acts of the insured's bookkeeper being stated as $5,000.
Plaintiff paid annual premiums from 1942 until 1948 when it paid an amount
equal to two and one-half times the annual premium for which the term of the
bond was extended three years. A clause in the bond stipulated: "The payment
of annual (or agreed) premiums during the term shall not render the amount of
this bond cumulative from year to year." In 1948 plaintiff discovered that its
bookkeeper had embezzled more than $5,000 during each of the years 1945, 1947
and 1948 and $3,975A7 in 1946. Plaintiff contended it should receive $18,975.47
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under the bond. Defendant admitted liability of $5,000. The U. S. District Court
for the District of Columbia granted a motion by the defendant for summary
judgment limiting liability to $5,000. Plaintiff agreed that under the phrase
"cumulative from year to year" if the bond remained in effect four years a loss of
$20,000 occurring the fourth year could not be fully compensated but that recovery
would be limited to $5,000 for that year. But plaintiff insisted that four losses
of $5,000, one occurring in each of the four years should be fully covered. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that the
fact that premiums were paid annually did not create a series of separate yearly
contracts, and that this continuing term together with the provision against cumulative liability limited recovery by the insured to the face amount of the bond.
Columbia Hospital For Women and Lying-In Asylum v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 188 F2d 654 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
The decision is in accord with the weight of authority which holds that an
insured's liability is limited to the amount stated in the bond, irrespective of the
number of annual periods in force or the number of annual premiums paid, based
upon the rationale that there is no justification for increasing the maximum
liability upon which the parties have specifically and expressly agreed. Hack v.
American Surety Co. of N. Y. 96 F2d 939 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied 305 U. S.
631 (1938) and see Extent of Liability on Fidelity Bonds Renewed From Year
to Year, 7 A. L R. 2d 946-990. Some cases have taken the opposite view. Standard
Accident Insurance Co. v. Collingdale State Bank, 85 F2d 375 (3rd Cir. 1936);
but most can be distinguished upon their facts. Cf. Maryland Casualty Co. v. First
National Bank, 246 F 892 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied 246 U. S. 670 (1917);
United States v. American Surety Co., 172 F2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1949), cert. denied
337 U. S. 930 (1949).
The fidelity bond in the principal case, as is usual in such bonds, contained a
Discovery Clause limiting the surety's liability to losses discovered within a
specified time (in this case two years) after the termination of employment of the
embezzler or the termination of the bond. Such limitations of liability have beeh
held reasonable and will be enforced. First National Bank v. National Surety Co.,
228 N. Y. 469, 127 N. E 479 (1920). Were- it not for this limitation as to
Discovery Period an insured could avoid the limitation imposed by the "noncumulative" provision by insuring each year with a-different company. A leading
reference book in discussing a hypothetical case says, "If the bond had been renewed
with a different company each year and the Discovery Period had not yet expired,
the insured would collect the entire loss, as each year's loss-would be covered in full
by each of the bonds." Werbel, General Insurance Guide 3106 (April 1951).
This peculiarity has persuaded at least one court to hold that separate contracts are
created by annual premiums. StandardAccident Insurance Co. v. CollingdaleState
Bank, 85 F2d 375 (3rd Cir. 1936) supra. It has occasioned implications that
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legislative action is called for. See Fidelity Bonds-Does It Pay To Renew Them?
27 Mich. L Rev. 442 (1928). It has been judicially termed "a game of heads I
win, tails you lose." Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commercial State Bank,
13 F2d 474, 476 (E. D. IIl. 1926), rev'd on other grounds and rehearing denied
19 F2d 969 (7th Cir. 1926).
Because fidelity insurers felt that the limitation of liability imposed by the
Discovery Period stifled competition, in that it discouraged an insured from
changing . companies, they introduced a so-called Superseded Suretyship Rider
which is attached to fidelity bonds written to replace others. By the terms of this
rider the insurer agrees to assume any losses which may have occurred under the
previou' bond, recovery for which is barred by the expiration of the Discovery
Period or by the Statute of Limitations. The Superseded Suretyship Rider, which
modifies the basic contract, very carefully specifies that it shall not be construed to
create an aggregate liability in excess of the face amount of the bond to which it is
attached. Clearly where a defalcation occurring during the period covered by the
prior bond is discovered within the Discovery Period specified in that bond and
at the same time a further defalcation during the period covered by the new bond
is discovered the insured can collect for each loss up to the face amount of each
bond-when the two bonds were written by two different companies. Similar
situations arising in cases where both bonds were written by the same company, in
order to change the form of bond for example, have resulted in full recovery on
both bonds, the courts holding the limitation as to aggregate liability in the Superseded Suretyship Rider to be inapplicable as the Discovery Periods on the prior
bonds had not yet elapsed. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Tulsa Industrial Loan and
Investment Co., 83 F2d 14 (10th Cir. 1936); Globe Indemnity Co. v. W'olcott &
Lincoln, 152 F2d 545, (8th Cit. 1945).
There is no question but that the intent of the surety is to limit its liability to
the face amount of the bond regardless of the term for which coverage is afforded.
See Werbel, supra at 3105. The courts will read this intent into the contract in the
absence of a contrary provision. II Cooley's Briefs on Insurance 1410 (2nd ed.).
The intent of the insured to so limit his protection is not nearly so clear; but it has
been held that the use of the termii "renewal period" is no indication that the bond
was understood to be other than a continuous contract. Brulatour v. Aetna Casmalty & Surety Co., 80 F2d 834 (2nd Cir. 1936). Even a bond which bore on the
back the inscription, "Dated: Sept. 1st, 1935, Expires: Sept. 1st, 1936" was construed to be a continuous contract under a rule of insurance law which holds that
conditions indorsed on the back of a policy must be ignored in construing it if no
sufficient reference thereto is made in the face of the instrument. Montgomery
Ward v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 F 2d 264 (7th Cir. 1947); 1 Couch, Insurance 316 (1929). There is a well established rule that if a fidelity bond is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one favorable to the insured and one favorable
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to the insurer, that construction will be adopted which favors the liability of the
insurer for the act or default in question. 5 Couch, Insurance 4327 (1929). The
terms of these bonds have generally been found "unequivocal in their nature" and
"unambiguous." Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.First National
Bank, 103 F2d
977 (3rd Cir. 1939); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Barber,70 F2d 220.
(6th Cir. 1934).
It has been argued that in view of the fact that an employee's defalcation in
a previous year had exhausted the insurer's liability as to him, premiums were paid
in subsequent years with no compensatory return. In answer it is pointed out that
the insured is still at an advantage in that it is not necessary for him to prove that
the loss took place in any particular year so long as it can be established that it was
within the time the bond was in force; and further that the Discovery Period is
extended by each annual premium. See Leonard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
80 F2d 205 (4th Cir. 1935).
The result of the instant case is unfortunate in that an insured may find
himself at a distinct disadvantage if be deals with the same company instead of
changing insurers each year; and moreover an insurer which receives a given
premium over a three year period from one insured accepts only one-third the
exposure that it would have if it received the same amount of premium income
from three insureds in one year. However the function of the court here was not
to create a new contract for the parties, but rather to interpret the existing contract
to which the parties had agreed.
Robert J. Blaney
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ORDINANCE RESTRICTING DOOR TO DOOR
SALES HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
Appellant, engaged in soliciting magazine subscriptions for a Pennsylvania
corporation, was convicted for violation of an ordinance of the City of Alexandria,
La., which made it a misdemeanor for solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant
merchants or transient vendors of merchandise to go upon private residences
without first having been requested to do so. Appellant claimed that the ordinance
was invalid in that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; that it was a burden on interstate commerce;
and that it violated the guarantee of the First Amendment of "freedom of press"
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
in affirming the conviction held that the ordinance was not a violation of the Due
Process Clause nor did it burden interstate commerce, and that the "freedom of the
press" is not absolute, nor does it give one the right to invade the privacy and
repose of the inhabitants of a city that has passed an ordinance to giv,' ;ts
citizens

